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Enumerated Powers of Congress

The Enumerated Powers contain an exhaustive list of powers granted to Congress. To exercise these powers, Congress may pass legislation that is necessary and proper to do so.

Commerce Power

Article I, section 8, clause 3 confers upon Congress the power to regulate three different types of commerce;

The Commerce Clause has been a key focus in my Constitutional Law class with Prof. Buys at SIU. It has evolved over the centuries. It has been expanded during the New-Deal era and then repressed due to concerns of government overreach. It now sits at a point that we will call "Post-Lopez".

Foundational Interpretation of the Commerce Clause

Gibbons v. Ogden introduced the following core principles of Commerce Regulation:

Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case): The power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to prohibit interstate commerce. (Think about the Mann Act)

United States v. Lopez and the Modern Take on the Commerce Clause

Lopez Saw the beginning of a step back from previous decisions approving congressional acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In Lopez, a teen who was found guilty of violating the Gun Free School Zone Act was found not guilty, as the Act was too indirectly related to commerce, the power on which the act was based.

The Lopez rule is as follows;

United States v. Morrison (2000) continued the precedent of Lopez by finding that the Violence Against Women Act was unconstitutional because it does not sufficient relate to interstate commerce, prohibiting Congress from passing a criminal statute on the basis that the crime substantially effects interstate commerce. The government provided extensive Congressional findings showing how violence against women relates to interstate commerce, but the court still rejected that argument.

Gonzalez v. Raich (2005) Reverted back to the deference the Court had shown Congress pre-Lopez, Stevens wrote that “[w]e need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” 545 U.S. at 22. In this decision, The Supreme Court referred to the Rational Basis Test which required that Congress' actions had a rational basis relating to their enumerated powers, in which regulation of commerce is included. However, the court still held that Lopez and Morisson were still good law and contrasted Raich by stating that the growing of marijuana is an economic action.

Economic is defined as ‘the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012)

The ACA created an individual mandate for individuals to purchase health insurance if not provided by their employer. If one did not purchase health insurance, the individual would need to report that and then pay a tax relating to the failure to purchase health insurance.

The court determined that inaction is not related to commerce. Chief Justice Robert wrote;

"Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Every day individuals do not do an infinite number of things. In some cases they decide not to do something; in others they simply fail to do it. Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless decisions an individual could potentially make within the scope of federal regulation, and—under the Government’s theory—empower Congress to make those decisions for him."

Dormant Commerce Clause

The dormant aspect of the commerce clause occurs when two events coalesce: (1) a state regulates interstate commerce (or foreign or Indian commerce), and (2) Congress has not preempted the state regulation by federal legislation. In the absence of such congressional action the Court implies some limits upon state regulation of interstate commerce.

Two requirements for Dormant Commerce Clause Claim;

The burden falls on the challenger to prove the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.

Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851)

"until Congress should find it necessary to exert its power, it should be left to the legislation of the States; that it is local and not national; that it is likely to be the best provided for, not by one system, or plan of regulations, but by as many as the legislative discretion of the several States should deem applicable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits."

Modern Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine

In USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1281 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1995), the court explained:

Philadelphia v. New Jersey (1978)

“Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. [If] a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”

The evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona (1945)

This case demonstrated an exercise of the balancing test to determine that a law passed by Arizona limiting the length of trains coming through the state, as it posed a serious burden on interstate commerce. The Court stated that limitations like the one from AZ should be decided by Congress, as there is a significant in uniformity when it comes to regulations on train length. It also found that AZ's regulation had no reasonable relation to safety.

Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. (1981)

Taylor v. Maine (1986) (Found that Maine's regulation of bait fish in the state was valid because it served a legitimate local purpose and could not be served by available nondiscriminatory methods)

Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979) (Court overruled Oklahoma's ban on exportation of native minnows. The objective was sound, but the flat ban was deemed overly-discriminatory and alternative methods were available).

Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. (1937) (Court found that compensating use tax was an acceptable instance of over discrimination because it was intended to place insiders and outsiders on equal footing in competition.)

Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner (1996) (the Court struck down a North Carolina tax on corporate stock owned by North Carolinians that was inversely proportional to the amount of the corporation’s income subject to North Carolina’s income tax.)

Pike v. Bruce Church (1970) (Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.)

Limits on The Commerce Clause: Principles of State Autonomy

Substantive Limits

In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), (Which was overruled in 1985, then revived in 1991) the Court determined that Congress could not use the commerce power to impinge upon a state’s policy choices in matters that are traditionally regarded as governmental (Police, Sanitation, Public Health, etc...) Congress is able to regulate States in their capacity as proprietors of businesses such as state-government owned oil refineries.

The four elements outlined in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association (1981) in determining substantive immunity are;

IN the Hodel Case, the Court found that regulation of private land did not impede on the States' ability to direct its governmental activities. It also found that regulating surface mining met the rational basis review according to Heart of Atlanta, as surface mining could rationally be found to have an impact on interstate commerce. The impacts affecting interstate commerce include unreclaimed lands, water pollution, erosion, floods, slope failures, loss of fish and wildlife resources, and a decline in natural beauty"

Procedural Limits

National League of Cities was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority (1985), which stated;

The Garcia majority stated that the state autonomy limit upon the commerce power is “one of process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the [commerce power] must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process.”

If states do not like the way they are being regulated by Congress, they must use the political process to change it. South Carolina v. Baker. The one caveat to this is if there is some defect in the political process, then action can be taken. Just because representatives from a state make a conflicting argument against the decision of Congress, that is just how Congress works and is not considered a defect.

Gregory v. Ashcrot (1991) Revival of National League of Cities

Gregory created a presumption against congressional interference with state decisions that are “fundamental [for] a sovereign,” and stating that only a clear and unequivocal statement of congressional intent to invade the domain of state sovereignty could suffice to establish that the statute had such an effect.

The anticommandeering doctrine does not apply when Congress evenhandedly regulates an activity in which both States and private actors engage.

New York v. United States (1992) (The Court strikes down the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 because it required states to either pass legislation providing for a disposal site for low level radioactive waste or to take title of the waste and become liable for all damages caused by the state's failure to take possession. New York decided that it did not want to follow the regulations of the statute, referencin the anti-commandeering doctrine which states that Congress cannot direct how a state government operates.)

Printz v. United States (1997) (Court invalidated part of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that temporarily required chief law enforcement officers of the states to carry out a background check program. The Court found that Congress can not Direct the actions of State officials.)

Reno v. Condon (2000) (The Court upheld commerce clause power to limit the ability to sell personal Driver license information obtained from state DL data without consent. The law limited the ability of both the states and private individuals to do this. Congress smply said that there were privacy considerations and that private information cannot be sold, it did not direct the state to do anything. Federal law preempts state law.)

Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (There was an argument whether repealing a prohibition or authorizing something is the same thing. A federal statute, PASPA, made it unlawful for a state to authorize sport gambling. The court enters a discussion regarding the anti-commandeering doctrine.)

The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine Restricts Congress ability to directly command State action. The doctrine is justified because;

Taxing Power

Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes...to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.

Limits to the Taxing Power

A consistent problem for the court is determing what is a tax to raise revenue vs what is a tax to penalize?

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922) (At this point, Congress was attempting to find a way to limit child labor in the states. Their first attempt to do so was in Dagenhart, where the court found that the court could not regulate child labor based on the Commerce Clause. Congress then imposed a 10% tax on businesses which utilize child labor.)

Valid Taxes

The court looks at 3 things to determine if a tax is valid;

The Court has moved away from examining these principles, as the court has taken a broader view as to what Congress can do where it relates to taxing.

United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (Upheld a congressional tax on “bookies”—professional gamblers in the business of accepting wagers. Bookies were required to register with the Collector of Internal Revenue. The Court rejected Kahriger’s argument that Congress’s reliance on its taxing power was a mere pretext—that it really sought to penalize intrastate gambling, which was the province of the states. Justice Reed wrote:

It does not matter that the tax discourages a certain activity, what matters is that it raises revenue. In this case, the court almost abandons limits on the taxing power.)

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

In this case, the court returns to the factors used in Bailey to determine that the Affordable Care Act was essentially a tax and therefore constitutional.

The Court has explained that

“if the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or p. 211omission.”

While the individual mandate clearly aims to induce the purchase of health insurance, it need not be read to declare that failing to do so is unlawful. Neither the Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS.

It is abundantly clear the Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation through inactivity. A capitation, after all, is a tax that everyone must pay simply for existing, and capitations are expressly contemplated by the Constitution.

As long as something raises revenue, it is within Congress' taxing power

Spending Power

Congress may “pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.” Art. I, §8. Congress may spend for anything it reasonably thinks will further the “general welfare” of the nation; it is not limited to spending in aid of its specific regulatory objectives. But this power is not unlimited.

Regulatory Spending is limited; Regulatory Spending is of no consequence when the ancillary regulation is within some independent regulatory power of Congress, such as the commerce power, but if spending is entirely regulatory and Congress has no source of regulatory authority, the spending initiative is invalid as an improper and pretextual means to attain an ultra vires end.

United States v. Butler (1936)

The original AAA was deemed unconstitutional because the revenue gained from taxing processors was given to the producers, it was not raising general revenue. Essentially, the tax on the processor was feeding the producer. It was considered coercion by economic pressure.

[The] government asserts that [the] Constitution authorizes the contemplated expenditure of the funds raised by the tax. This contention presents the great and the controlling question in the case. [The] government does not attempt to uphold the validity of the act on the basis of the commerce clause [but relies instead upon the spending clause]. It is not contended that [the spending clause] grants power to regulate agricultural production upon the theory that such legislation would promote the general welfare. The government concedes that the phrase “to provide for the general welfare” qualifies the power “to lay and collect taxes.” The view that the clause grants power to provide for the general welfare, independently of the taxing power, has never been authoritatively accepted. . . . The true construction undoubtedly is that the only thing granted is the power to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation’s debts and making provision for the general welfare.

The reason that it is important that the revenue goes into the general treasury is because it allows people to compete for the money, which gives congress more choice in how it wants to allocate its funds.

South Dakota v. Dole (1987): State Autonomy Limits to the Spending Power

The question which came up in this case is if Congress can withhold funds with the goal of encouraging the state to take specific action, in this case raising the minimum drinking age. Here, Congress wanted to withhold 5% of the funds dedicate to highways in the state if the age is not raised.

The limits to Congress ability to place conditions on funds are influenced by the following factos;

There is still a choice which can be made by the states in regards to this issue, as well as grants which can be received to account for the lost funds for refusing to increase the minimum drinking age. As long as there an actual ability for the state to choose, Congress may create spending provisions to encourage states to act in a certain way. Encouragement not Coercive.

Underinclusive: It does not aide to prevent adult drinkers from driving drunk.

Overinclusive: It stops teenagers from drinking when they are not planning on driving.

The closer the fit between what Congress said it is trying to do and what the law actually does, the mroe likely the law will be found to be constitutional.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012): Passing the undrawn line into the world of Unconstitutionality

If states refused to expand their eligibility coverage, the state would lose 100% of their medicaid funds. Turning down all medicaid funds would leave a significant portion of the state without medical coverage, essential putting a gun to their head so that states are forced to adopt the system brought by the federal court.

When “pressure turns into compulsion,” the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism. “[T]he Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate.” New York. That is true whether Congress directly commands a State to regulate or indirectly coerces a State to adopt a federal regulatory system as its own.

Treaty Power

Art. II s. 2 states that the president has the power to negotiate treaties, and may implement treaties if 2/3rds of the Senate Agrees.

Missouri v. Holland (1920)

Court found that the rules created by a treaty are constitutional, as the authority to create those rules stems from the United States, not the constitution.

This relates to the Lacy Act, which prohibited hunting of the birds that was related to interstate commerce, not the local hunting of the birds. An act of Congress attempted to regulate this, but was struck down as a violation of the commerce power. This treaty then stepped up to create a law which was constitutional and could be enforced.
This case found that there were limits on state power, especially when there is a wider impact on the rest of the country.

Limits on the Treaty Power

War Making Power

The President has the power to conduct war as Commander in Chief, but Congress has the power to Declare War on foreign nations.

Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. (1948)

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